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The International Law of Compensation
for Expropriation and International Debt:
A Dangerous Uncertainty
By KENNETH M. SIEGEL
Member of the Class of 1985

I. INTRODUCTION
The legal and economic ramifications of a less developed country's
(LDC's) repudiation of its international debt is an issue that only recently has begun receiving attention from legal and economic writers.' In
spite of the relative inattention this issue has received, it is a contention
of this Note that the possibility of such repudiations is real and should
not be ignored.
Currently, the political and economic conditions in many LDC's
with large external debts militate in favor of debt repudiation. This Note
will examine these political and economic factors along with the current
state of international lending. This Note will also attempt to show how
certain practices are exacerbating already difficult problems and perhaps
pushing borrowers to the point of repudiation.
It must be recognized at the outset that an international debt is
property (a chose in action) to the lender.- Like other property, debts are
subject to the risk of expropriation. 3 It is a contention of this Note that
debt repudiation is analogous to expropriation by a state of any other
property held by aliens within the state. Thus, this Note will go on to
examine the current state of public international law regarding state responsibility for injury to aliens resulting from expropriation.
The conclusion reached by this Note is that there is currently no
generally accepted rule of international law governing the rights of aliens
1. For examples of this recent attention, see How an LDC Default Would flit the U.&
Economy, Bus. WK, Nov. 7, 1983, at 118 [hereinafter cited as LDC Default]; White, Wealth
Deprivation: Creditor and ContractClains, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 01 STATE RL:SPONSIIIILITy FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS

149 (R. Lillich ed. 1983).

2. White, supra note 1, at 149-52.
3. See Gordillo, Argentina, in EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS 22 (A. Lowenfeld ed.

1971).
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whose property has been expropriated. Furthermore, the absence of a
generally accepted rule presents opportunities to borrowers that may be
considering debt repudiation and concomitant dangers to lenders. Finally, this Note will suggest courses of action through which lenders may
reduce the risk of repudiation and the harm which would result should
debt repudiation occur. These recommendations focus primarily on debt
renegotiation, taking into consideration the internal political and economic conditions of borrowing countries.
II.
A.

INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND
THE DEBT CRISIS

The Source and Magnitude of the Problem

The current debt crisis can be attributed, in part, to the dramatic
rise in the price of oil in the early 1970's.4 This increase resulted in huge
accumulations of dollars in the hands of the oil exporting countries.
These dollars were in turn deposited into banks which then loaned
money to the developing countries. This process is known as "recycling."5 The lending continued even after the price of oil had peaked
and the capital flow into the banks had slowed. The growth in international lending to developing countries was twenty-one percent per year
from 1979 to 1981, greatly exceeding the growth of bank reserves for the
same period.6 The result of this phenomenon is that the banks' resources
for dealing with potential problems are growing smaller while the outstanding loans (and hence the risks) are growing larger. Indeed this exposure presents a major risk to leading international lenders.7 The effect
that a default or repudiation of international loans would have on any
particular bank or on the world economy in general is uncertain. The
effect on the United States economy and banks would depend on many
factors including which borrowers were involved, the total amount of
indebtedness involved, and the response of the Federal Reserve Bank.8 It
4. The price of oil jumped from $3.89/bbl in 1973 to $6.87/bbl in 1974. The price con.
tinued to climb to S31.77/bbl in 1981. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT"r OF COM., 198283 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 715 (103d ed.).
5. Smith, How Banks Got Into Such Trouble, ESQUIRE, Jan. 1983, at 14.
6. Id. at 16.
7. "Mexico and Brazil . . . each account ... for about one third of the capital of all
U.S. banks, and about 45% of the capital of the nine largest U.S. banks. The exposure in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela alone accounted at the end of 1982 for 150%
of the capital of Citicorp, BankAmerica, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical
and Crocker National. In short, the risk for U.S. banks is mammoth." United States Study
Paints Regional Debt in a Range of Rose, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Sept. 30, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
8. LDC Default, supra note 1.
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is certain, however, that "the risk for U.S. banks is mammoth." 9
B.

Coordinated Lending as "Security"

In spite of the magnitude of the risk, the problem of debt repudiation has received relatively little attention, particularly from the perspective of international law.' 0 This is partly attributable to a common
perception that a major default or repudiation is unlikely to occur. This
sense of security is derived from the opinion that a default or repudiation
of international debt is unlikely since it would ruin the borrower's international credit rating and thereby exclude the defaulting state from borrowing in the international money markets."1 Indeed, it has been stated
that a foreign government's only incentive to repay direct or guaranteed
international debts is its desire for continued borrowing.'" This incentive
default or repudiation of internais apparently strong since historically,
3
tional debt has been rare.'
The assertion that nations are motivated to repay their external debt
by a fear of being denied access to additional capital is well supported by
the degree to which international lending is coordinated, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acting as a de facto clearing house for
international loans."4 Since the early 1950's, a country's access to foreign
capital has been dependent upon compliance with IMF policies. 5 A
country that refuses IMF advice, or is denied an IMF loan for other
reasons, will find other public and private sources of capital reluctant or
unwilling to lend. 6 Thus, the IMF's willingness to lend has become a
certification of a country's creditworthiness.' 7 Because the IMF's "seal of
approval"'" has become a precondition for access to foreign capital, it is
appropriate to turn the inquiry to the IMF.
9. United States Study PaintsRegionalDebt in a Range of Rose, Latin Am. Weekly Rep.,

Sept. 30, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
10. For exceptions, see sources cited in White, supra note 1, at 152.
11. LDC Default, supra note 1; see also 22 U.S.C. § 2370(d) (1983).
12. White, supra note 1, at 163 (citing P. EINzIG, ROLI.OVER CRF.DITS 49 (1973)).
13. White, supra note 1, at 158.
14. D. BLAKE & R. WALTERS, THE POLITICS OF GI.OIIAi. EcoNoMIic RELATIONS 72

(1976).
15. E. MASON & R. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BR.roN WOOiS 543 (1973).
16. D. BLAKE & R. WAI.TERS, supra note 14, at 72.
17. P. VERBIT, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM AND THE DE VELOPING COutNTRIES: THE RULE OF LAW PROBLEM 298 (1975).

18. White, supra note 1, at 164.
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The International Monetary Fund
1. Background

The IMF was established at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944.
The conferees were charged with the task of developing an international
organization and policies to solve the economic problems which had
plagued the world during the 1930's. The 1930's had been a period of
protectionism and isolationism which wreaked havoc on the balance of
international payments.' 9 In addition to correcting the problems of the
1930's, the conferees were also faced with resolving the international economic problems which were anticipated to follow World War II.20
The main economic problem to be faced by the IMF immediately
after the war was that the United States, as the only major industrialized
nation with its productive capacity left intact, would have to supply the
majority of the manufactured materials required to rebuild war-torn Europe. Since the productive capacities of the European countries had been
destroyed, they would be unable to sell goods back to the United States
and enormous payments imbalances were anticipated. 2 The IMF was
designed to facilitate the correction of these and future balance of payments problems. More specifically, the IMF was intended to serve "as a
formal mechanism to ease the problems of disequilibrium in the balance
of payments of states, to facilitate payments adjustments and exchangerate stability, and, more generally, to insure international monetary cooperation and the expansion of trade."2 2 To achieve these goals, the
IMF created and maintains a fund from which members can draw mon24
ies when necessary.2 3 The fund is made up of members' subscriptions
which are paid to the IMF twenty-five percent in gold and seventy-five
percent in the member's own currency.25
19.

W. SCAMMELL, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLicy: BRETTON WOODS AND Ail-

TER 5, 133 (1975).

20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 124.

22. D. BLAKE & R. WALTERS, supra note 14, at 46. See also W. SCArvMiMEI.IL, supra note
19, at 128.

23. For a summary of IMF operations, see P. VERBrT, supra note 17, at 285-95.
24. The amount of a member's quota is determined by the IMF (except founding members whose quotas are set forth in the articles of agreement). Articles of Agreement of te
International Monetary Fund, adopted July 22, 1944 at the U.N. Monetary & Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (entered htoforce Dec. 27. 1945), amended effective
July 28, 1969, by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 235, adopted May 31, 1968, art. III, § I [hereinafter cited as Articles], reprintedin J.Goti,
STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS OF THE IMF, app. IX (1970).
25. Id. art. III, § 3.
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2.

IMF "Lending"

When an IMF member is facing an international payments problem,

it may purchase another member's currency from the IMF with its own
currency. A member may make unconditional purchases of another
member's currency until the purchases equal the twenty-five percent of
the purchaser's subscription quota which was paid into the IMF in
gold.2 6 In other words, the purchaser "borrows" against its gold deposit.
This is known as a "gold tranche" purchase.2 7 Additionally, a member
may make further purchases up to 200% of its quota.2 8 Purchases above
the gold tranche are called "credit tranche" purchases. Credit tranche
purchases are not unconditional, however, and must be approved by the

IMF. "Requests for purchases from the first credit tranche [the second
twenty-five percent of the purchaser's quota] are treated 'liberally.' Beyond that 9 tranche, however, purchases require substantial
2
justification.
Also of interest are Stand-By arrangements. 3" These arrangements

are subject to the same limits as the credit tranches (ie., 200% of a member's quota). They differ, however, in the following respect: unlike

"credit tranche" purchases, which are requested and approved when an

emergency arises, Stand-By's are arranged in advance. The IMF agrees
to make a certain amount of currency available to the borrower over a
specified period of time. In exchange, the borrower agrees to meet the
terms designated by the Stand-By arrangement. 3
26. Articles, supra note 24, art. V, § 3(d).
27. Id art. XIX(j). A gold tranche purchase is more specifically defined as "a purchase
by a member of the currency of another member in exchange for its own currency which does
not cause the Fund's holdings of the member's currency to exceed one hundred percent of its
quota ...... Id
28. Id. art. V, § 3(a)(iii).
29. P. VERBIT, supra note 17, at 287; see also E. MASON & R. ASHMi, supra note 15. at
539-44.
30. See generally J.GoLu, supra note 24.
31. P. VERBIT, supra note 17, at 290-91. Although Stand-By arrangements vary, their
components generally include the following:
(1) abolition or liberalization of foreign exchange and import controls:
(2) devaluation of the exchange rate;
(3) domestic anti-inflationary programes. including:
(a) control of bank credit- higher interest rates: and perhaps higher reserve requirements;
(b) control of the government deficit: curbs on spending; increase-s in
taxes and in prices charged by public enterprises; abolition of consumer subsidies;
(c)control of wage rises, so far as within the government's power.
(d)dismantling of price controls; and
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Conditions Placed on "Borrowing"

Both the straight credit tranche purchases and the Stand-By's are
conditioned on the purchaser adhering to an IMF stabilization plan
which is designed to correct the underlying causes of the balance of payments problem.32 The conditionality of access to capital serves as an inducement for a borrowing country to take the steps necessary to achieve
balanced international payments within a reasonable period of time. 3
Stabilization plans focus on both the internal and external economic conditions of the borrower. Externally, the goal is to bring into balance the
supply and demand for foreign currency while restricting trade and payments as little as possible. Internally, the goal is to bring into balance the
supply and demand for credit by noninflationary methods.3 4
There are generally four options available to correct a balance of
payments problem: 1) Rely on reserves of foreign exchange as long as
possible; 2) pursue deflationary fiscal and monetary policies to reduce
prices and income, thus stimulating exports and curbing imports; 3) devalue the currency of the country; or 4) impose direct controls on imports.35 The IMF prescription is a combination of deflationary policies
and limited exchange devaluations.3 6
Deflationary fiscal and monetary policies, however, reduce employment and national income. In order to be effective, the measures prescribed by the IMF must reduce national income by an amount equal to
many times the amount of the payments deficit.37 This leads to deflation
which results in a substantial increase in unemployment and which can
lead to a major political backlash.3 8 Given these side effects of the IMF
prescription, some LDC's believe that this option contravenes one of the
stated purposes of the IMF.39 Article I, section (ii) of the Articles of
Agreement of the IMF states that one of the purposes of the IMF is "to
contribute. . . to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of em(4) greater hospitality to foreign investment.
C. PAYER, THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THIE THIRD

WORLD 33 (1974).
32. P. VERBIT, supra note 17, at 294.
33. E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 15, at 542.
34. Id. at 541.
35. W. SCAMMEL, supra note 19, at 7.
36. P. VERBIT, supra note 17, at 55.
37. "For example, if 5 percent of a nation's income is spent on imports (more correctly, if
the marginal propensity to import is .05), national income would have to decline 20 times the
proposed decrease in imports." P. VERBIT, supra note 17, at 54.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 296.
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ployment and real income." 4
The second part of the IMF prescription, currency devaluation, also
has negative political and economic effects on the borrowing state. Politically, devaluation may be equated with the government admitting that
its economic policies have failed. This is an admission that few governments want to make. Economically, devaluation may decrease total export earnings, particularly if the exports are largely composed of primary
products which face relatively inelastic demand. This problem is especially likely in LDC's because, almost by definition, LDC's do not have
the manufacturing capacity to have manufactured goods make up a significant portion of their exports.4 1
Combining the options outlined above, as the IMF does, lessens the
hardships which either option alone would produce. Nonetheless, internal hardship is part of the price of borrowing from the IMF." Because
of the power to dictate terms through conditional lending,43 and the
enormous resources available to the IMF, the IMF has been called "the
most powerful supranational government in the world today."' Given
the side effects of the IMF prescription, and the borrower's lack of
choice, LDC's are left at best feeling that their problems and concerns
are being ignored;4 5 at worst, they feel that the IMF is a tool for international interference in their national affairs.4 6
In addition to the arguments against the IMF prescription set forth
above, there is a further argument that the prescription is perpetuating
rather than helping to correct the underlying problems of borrowing
states. The IMF loans money to countries in order to rescue them from a
payments crisis. This rescue only delays facing the problem squarely,
since the money will ultimately have to be paid back-with interest ac40. Articles, supra note 24, art. I, § (ii).
41. P. VERBIT, supra note 17, at 303.
42. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.

43. The wealthier members of the IMF are able to dictate borrowing terms under the
voting contained in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 24. The rules provide
that voting power in the IMF is pro rata, each member having 250 votes plus one vote for each
S100,000 of quota (art. XII, § 5(a)). When the voting concerns the waiving of conditions
limiting the use of IMFs resources, additional votes are given to surplus countries and subtracted from deficit countries (art. XII, § 5(b)).
Under this system, the large industrialized countries have about 75% of the quotas and
about two-thirds of the votes. (See D. BLAKE & R. WALTr s,supra note 14. at 70.) This
situation tends to undermine the independent international nature of the IMF and turns the
IMF into a forum for airing political rather than economic diffierences of opinion on international economic issues. (See W. SCAMMEI.L, supra note 19, at 121.)
44. C. PAYER, supra note 31, at ix.
45. D. BLAKE & R. WALTERS, supra note 14, at 69-70, 73.
46. P. VERBIT, supra note 17, at 296.
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cruing in the interim. Further, the IMF rescue is conditional, and, according to this argument the conditions serve to perpetuate the colonial
economic patterns which got the borrowers into trouble in the first place.
Thus, the borrowers will never be able to repay the original loan and
instead will be getting deeper into debt and "will have to run faster and
faster just to stay in the same place."4 7
D.

International Debt and National Politics

According to one writer, the involvement of the IMF and other international organizations in the debtor/creditor relations of international
lending has changed the attitude of debtors toward their debt. Instead of
regarding their debts as private contractual obligations, the borrowers
have begun to consider the debts as mere pawns in national and international politics.4 8 On the national political front, the governments of borrowing countries are faced with the difficult task of balancing many
different interests.4 9 Additionally, they are confronted "with a major
political dilemma: choosing the psychological pain of economic neocolonialism or the economic pain of real independence. "' 5 Chile, under
Salvador Allende, viewed the price of economic isolation as worth the
independence gained; 5 1 most other states (including modern-day Chile)
are not willing to pay this price.
Rather, the borrowers accept the IMF terms which create economic
hardships,52 perhaps amounting to a denial of basic human rights."'
These are terms which the borrower often would not agree to if given the
choice 54 and which may in fact threaten the very existence of the borrowing government.55 By accepting the terms, the borrowers are placed between two powerful and opposed forces: international creditors on one
side and national political forces on the other. There is a question as to
how long this can continue before borrowers decide that the internal
price of compliance with IMF terms is too high. While any purported
answer would be speculative, recent events in Latin America and elsewhere may indicate that the breaking point is near for some countries.
47. C. PAYER, supra note 31, at 47.
48. Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1983, at 30, col. 4.
49. RIESARCH AND POLICY COMMn-rIEE, COmMriE FOR ECONOMIC DIvELOI'MNT.
STRENGTHENING THE WORI.D MONETARY SYSTEM 13-14 (1973).
50. S. BROWN, Nrw FORCES IN WORLD PoLrrlcs 154 (1974).
51. D. BLAKE & R. WALTERS, supra note 14, at 71.

52. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
53. White, supra note 1, at 170-71.
54. E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 15, at 542,

55. P. VERBIT, supra note 17, at 301.
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Argentina and Brazil are cases in point. In Argentina, the president of the Central Bank was temporarily jailed. He was charged by a
federal judge with failing to represent Argentina's national interests
when renegotiating part of Argentina's over $40 billion in external
debt. 6 In the capital of Brazil, authorities invoked emergency police
powers in anticipation of disturbances during congressional consideration of IMF backed wage control legislation. The legislation was
designed to combat Brazil's 175% inflation rate.5 7 If the internal political pressures do reach the breaking point, nationalization in the form of
debt repudiation may be the response. Indeed, it is possible that a debtor
government, subordinating its own beliefs, may repudiate the nation's
international debt in response to pressure from political opponents who
are gaining popular support by calling for debt repudiation.58 "It can be
potent politics for an opposition to claim that a sitting government is
throwing its own people out of work to pay back U.S. Banks."'59
As support for this proposition, it must be noted that nationalization
is often a response to a period of popular unrest and political stress.'
Not only is nationalization viewed as a cure for all economic ills,6 but it
also gives the appearance of reducing the poor country's dependence
upon wealthier states.62 An example of this latter nationalism/propaganda element is the Cuban nationalizations of the early 1960's.63
E. Summary
Borrowing countries have been demanding more lenient repayment
terms in debt rescheduling talks; 6 Brazil has received some concessions.6" There has also been discussion of debt moratoria, either by individual countries or via a debtor's cartel.6 6 Additionally, and most
56.
57.
58.
59.

Wall St. J.,
Oct. 4, 1983, at 36, col. 2.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1983, at 30, col. 4.
Id.

60. B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (1959).
61. Id.
62. D. BLAKE & R. WALTERS, supra note 14, at 173.
63. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401.05 (1963).
64. See White, supra note 1, at 164-65.
65. Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1983, at 2, col. 2.
66. For example, "The [Brazilian party] PMDB advocates a 5-year moratorium on interest and principal payments, reduction of the principal outstanding, 'taking into account the
high spreads, exaggerated commissions and other special fees as advanced repayment of principal,' a maximum annual debt-servicing quota determined as a percentage or the country's exports, and a 25-year period to pay off the debt." Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Sept. 30, 1983, at 4,
col. 2; 237 THE NATION, Dec. 3, 1983, at 557, col. 2.
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alarmingly, there have been demands for conversion of some debts into
grants as part of a New International Economic Order." If the internal
pressures continue to rise and the external demands for repayment are
not satisfied, repudiation may ensue. Resorting to debt repudiation to
alleviate a payments crisis would not be unprecedented. 68 Therefore, the
problems and the risks of debt repudiation are real and require immediate attention.
The security derived from coordinating international lending
through the IMF has become a two edged sword. While it has given the
lenders the power to dictate terms they believed were best for all, it has
also turned international debt into a political issue whereby internationally imposed conditions on borrowing have conflicted with borrowers'
national interests. 69 This conflict, as well as the inability of the developing countries to repay existing loans on the original terms, are finally
being recognized by the developed countries and their banks.70 Unfortunately, it may be too late to release the pressure which has been building
and which may lead some LDC's to repudiation. It is therefore necessary to see what protection, if any, international law would provide in the
event of either an isolated or widespread debt repudiation. It is to this
question that this Note now turns.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEBT REPUDIATION
In any legal dispute the parties have at their disposal the same body
of law to use to find support for their position. While the lenders may
look to international law for protection of their foreign investments, the
borrowers may look to the same body of law to find justification for debt
repudiation.7 1 Thus, the following material should be viewed with both
the borrowers' and the lenders' perspectives in mind.
A.

Choice of Law

In determining what law would apply to a given repudiation, it is
expedient to categorize different types of loans.
67. White, supra note 1, at 154.
68. See C. PAYER, supra note 31, at 15; White, supra note 1,at 157-59.
69. See supra text accompanying note 48.
70. White, supra note 1, at 155; see also Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1983, at 1,col. 1.
71. This latter possibility is particularly likely of leaders of borrowing countries like Salvador Allende of Chile who was characterized as "a radical with a flair for legal niceties." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1971, at E3, col. 6.
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1. Governmental Loans
These are loans between governments or between international organizations and governments. These loans would be governed by international law unless the parties specifically contracted for the law of a
particular state to apply.72
2.

Quasi-governmental Loans

These are loans from an international organization to a public or
private borrower which are guaranteed by the borrower's state. These
loans are likely to have been "internationalized" 7 3 in which case international law would apply.7 4
3.

Private Loans to Foreign Governments

These are loans from a private lender to a foreign government. Generally, these loans would be governed by either the borrowing state's law
or the law of the lending state, depending on the loan agreement. These
loans would not be protected by international law unless the repudiation
was arbitrary or discriminatory.7 5
4. Private Loans to Private Borrowers
These are loans between private parties of different nations. There
would be no protection under international law for the interference with
a creditor's interest caused by the interference with the debtor's property
by the debtor's state (e.g., taking property in which the creditor holds a
security interest).7 6
In theory then, the first two categories of loans would be governed
by international law, and the third category would be governed by international law only if the repudiation were arbitrary or discriminatory.
Although "[t]he thought that the legal standard to be applied in a particular case is going to be determined by one of the parties to the dispute is
contrary to civilized notions of fairness," 7 7 it must be noted at the outset
72. White, supra note 1, at 159.

73. Loans are "internationalized" when a borrower's government guarantees the loan.
The guarantee becomes a claim against the government; the government, unlike the borrower,
is subject to public international law rules. White, supra note 1, at 157.
74. Id; General Conditions Applicable to Loan and Guarantee Agreements, Jan. 31,
1969, International Bank for Reconstruction Development-Republic or China, § 9.01, 691
U.N.T.S. 300.
75. White, supra note 1, at 160. See also infra text accompanying notes 79-83.
76. White, supra note 1, at 172.

77. Brower, The Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States and the American Con-
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that there is disagreement as to whether disputes concerning expropriation are subject to scrutiny under international law at all. 78
B.

Traditional International Law

The traditional rules of international law recognize the right of sovereign nations to expropriate private property for a public purpose un-

less such expropriation is discriminatory or carried out without provision
for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation . 79 The first element, a

public purpose, is in essence only a procedural issue. The procedural
questions are: 1) who will determine the public purpose; and 2) what
right of review or appeal will there be, if any, from the decision."0 That
the element of public purpose is merely procedural follows from the fact

that where state action is involved, the concept of public purpose is really
a tautology. "Everything a state does-whether the decision is made by
judicial, executive, or legislative power-is presumably made for a reason
of state.""1
The second requirement is that the taking must not be discrimina-

tory. A taking is discriminatory if similarly situated property of a comparable nature which is owned by nationals or citizens of a third state is
not taken,12 or if the decision as to what property to take was based

solely on grounds of racial, religious, ethnic or national distinctions."3 It
should be noted that a taking would not be considered discriminatory if a

state expropriates alien-owned property where there is no comparable
property owned by nationals.8 4
stitutional Tradition:A Bicentennial Perspective on the "New InternationalEconomic Order."
10 INT'L LAW. 701, 706 (1976).
78. See infra notes 113-32 and accompanying text; see also Haight, The New International
Economic Order and the Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAW. 591,
600-01 (1975).
79. See Notes from Sec. of State Hull to the Government of Mexico, in 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIG. Of INT'L L. 658-59 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Notes to Mexico]; Award on the
Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1, 21
(1978); Goldman & Paxman, Real Property Valuations in Argentina, Chile and Mexico, in 2
THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 130.31 (R. Lillich
ed. 1973).
80. Lowenfeld, Introduction, in EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS 3 (A. Lowenfeld ed.
1971).
81. Id.
82. Piper, New Directionsin the Protectionof American-OwnedProperty Abroad, 4 INT'L
TRADE L.J. 315, 319-20 (1979).
83. Weston, The Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of
Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 447 (1981).
84. Id. at 442 (citing G. WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 144 (1961)).
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Although there is doubt as to whether discrimination alone will constitute a violation of international law,8 5 nationalization without the third
element, prompt and adequate compensation, is an international wrong
even if not discriminatory. 8 6 Compensation is not prompt, adequate, and
effective unless the foreign owner promptly receives the going concern
value or at least the fair market value8 of the expropriated property, in a
usable currency.8 8 In the traditional view, the duty to compensate is absolute; if the expropriating nation cannot afford the compensation, it
should not expropriate.8 9 The exceptions to the general rule, i.e., where
compensation would not be required in international law, are very limited: a) property taken as a fine or forfeiture as a criminal punishment; b)
taking by way of taxation; and c) indirect taking (e.g., restrictions on
land use).90 There is possibly a fourth exception which a defaulting borrower could attempt to invoke. In the Russian Indemnity Award, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration held that the Ottoman Empire could
have been discharged from its debt to the Russian government if paying
the debt or obtaining a loan for that purpose "would imperil the existence of the Ottoman Empire or seriously compromise its internal or external situation." 9 1
Arguably, the situation existing in some borrowing countries may be
approaching the point where continued payment of international obligations is threatening the seated government. If this can be shown, perhaps the exception indicated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
would be applicable. As Gillian White points out, however, the burden
of proof is a heavy one-one which has yet to be met. 92 It should be
noted that although prompt, adequate, and effective compensation is the
standard of traditional international law, states have accepted less in order to further peaceful relations. Since World War II, an estimated
ninety-five percent of expropriation compensation claims have been settled by lump sum agreements.9 3 These agreements are negotiated
through diplomatic channels; the expropriating nation generally pays a
85. Piper, supra note 82, at 320.
86. B. WORTLEY, supra note 60, at

121.

87. Covington & Burling, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE PROPERTIES
OF SOCIEDAD MINERA EL TENIENTE BY CHILE IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAN%

PRINCIPLES (1971), reprintedin 2 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

B. WORTLEY, supra note 60, at 133.
Id. at 158.
Id.at 39.
White, supra note 1, at 158.
Id.
Weston, supra note 83, at 456.
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lump sum to the claimant state which then assumes responsibility for4
compensating its own nationals who were injured by the expropriation.
These agreements do not, however, change the traditional rule. 95
C. Current Standing of the Traditional Rule
1. The United States' View
The traditional rule discussed in the preceding section was restated
in 1962 in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 which
concerned permanent sovereignty over natural resources 96 and the
United States still adheres to this rule.97 As a practical matter, however,
the United States' adherence to this rule is irrelevant. If a taking is carried out by one of the states of the United States, or by the United States
itself, the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution98 would protect the injured owner(s). If the taking of property
owned by a United States citizen occurs elsewhere, then it is the taking
nation's adherence to the rule which is important, not the adherence of
the United States.
2.

Modern Challenges to the Traditional Rule

There were doubts as to the general acceptance of the traditional
rule prior to, 99 and contemporaneous with, the passing of Resolution
1803. The United States Supreme Court stated in 1963 that "[tihere are
few if any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be
so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens."'" This division of opinion stems in part from the fact that
many developing countries believe that the traditional rules of international law formulated in the nineteenth century were inapplicable to
them. 0 1 The developing countries took no part in the formulation of the
94. B. WORTLEY, supra note 60, at 146.
95. Wortley points out that "a State may exercise the liberty to accept less than is due to it
or its nationals. . .[b]ut the exercise of this liberty by the creditor State is a different matter
from saying that the debtor has a right to fix the terms on which he will be free from liability."
Id. at 154.
96. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962)[hereinafter cited as Resolution 1803].
97. Brower, supra note 77, at 705. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 711-712 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982),
98. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
99. See, e.g., statements by Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1938, in 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 657-58 (1942).
100. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-29 (1963).
101. Id. at 430.
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rules,102 nor did they consent to them.' 0 3 The developing countries further believe that the rules were not only formulated in their absence but
were in fact formulated against their interests." ° The rules, they argue,
reflect the inequalities of the colonial era in which the laws were formulated.10 5 This challenge to the validity of the traditional rule was accompanied by pressure from developing countries for the formulation of a
new set of rules, rules which would reflect the current state of the world
and serve the interests of all nations. The challenge to the traditional
rule gained momentum in the eleven years that followed the passage of
Resolution 1803. In this period, the United Nations had extended membership to approximately thirty new nations, the majority of which were
developing nations in Africa and Asia.' 0 6 With the strength of the LDC's
thus enhanced in the General Assembly, a new resolution concerning
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, General Assembly Resolution 3171,1°7 was passed.
D.

The New "Rule"
1. The Obligation to Compensate

Resolution 3171 clearly manifested a rejection of the traditional
rule. Resolution 1803, which essentially was a restatement of the traditional rule, provided that in the case of nationalization, "the owner shall
be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force
in the state taking such measures. . . and in accordance with international law."' 0 8 In contrast, Resolution 3171 provides that "each State is
entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode
of payment, and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in
accordance with the national legislation of each state carrying out such
102. Lillich, The CurrentStatus of The Law of State Responsibilityfor Injuriesto Aliens, in
2 (R. Lillich ed.
1983) (citing Statements by Judge Padilla Nervo of Mexico before the U.N. International Law
Commission. Summary Records of the 413th Meeting, [1957] 1 Y.B. IN"L L Co'vms'N 155,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957 [hereinafter cited as Summary Records]).
103. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1963).
104. Lillich, supra note 102, at 2.
105. Summary Records, supra note 102, at 155.
106. G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30A) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973), reprinted in 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 381 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Resolution 3171].
G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.31), U.N. Doc. A/9631, art. 2(2)(c) (1974) [hereinafter cited as Charter].
107. Compare the voting rosters for Resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 3171 (XXVIII) in U.N.
Resolutions (Djonovich), Ser. I General Assembly, Vols. IX (1962-63) and XIV (1972-74)
respectively.
108. Resolution 1803, supra note 96, art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE REsPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS
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measures."' 0 9 The requirements that the owner shall be paid compensation and that disputes be settled in accordance with international law are
conspicuously absent.
Within six months of passing Resolution 3171, the United Nations
I
General Assembly passed the Declaration 0 and Program of Action I
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. These
Resolutions are relevant to this inquiry for three reasons. First, they represent the continued demands of the developing countries for a concerted
effort to narrow the widening gap in income between the developed and
developing countries.' 2 Secondly, and more specifically, Resolution 3202
calls for "[d]ebt renegotiation on a case-by-case basis with a view to concluding agreements on debt cancellation, moratorium, rescheduling or interest subsidization.""' 3 Finally, these Resolutions are significant in their
call for the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States ("Charter")." 4
The call was met and the Charter was adopted in 1974 as General
Assembly Resolution 3281.'1' Charter Article 2, paragraph 2 (c) provides that states have the right to "nationalize, expropriate or transfer
ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation
should be. paid."' "16 Recall that the traditional rule called for compensation as one element of a legal expropriation. The Charter, in contrast,
appears to make compensation optional-at the option of the expropriating state. Thus, whereas the traditional rule embodied in Resolution
1803 provides that compensation shall be paid, the Charter provides that
compensation should be paid. This change places the obligation of compensation itself into doubt.
2. Rights of Aliens in Relation to Rights of Nationals
The Charter represents an assault on another aspect of the traditional rule as well. With limited exceptions, 1 7 it is generally accepted
109. Resolution 3171, supra note 106, art. 3.
110. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Resolution 3201].
111. G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) (liereinafter cited as Resolution 3202].
112. See Resolution 3201, supra note 110, preamble and para. 1.
113. Resolution 3202, supra note 111, art. I, para. 2(g) (1974) (emphasis added).
114. Id. art. VI; Resolution 3201, supra note 110, § 6.
115. Charter, supra note 106.
116. Id. art. 2, para. 2(c) (emphasis added).
117. Resolution 1803, supra note 96, art. I, § 4.
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that local remedies must be exhausted" 8 before resorting to international forums. The United States adheres to the view that even in local
forums aliens are entitled to an internationally recognized minimum
standard of protection" t9 regardless of how a state treats its nationals.
According to the United States view, a state may not impose the same
standards on aliens as it imposes on nationals if such treatment would
fall below the internationally accepted minimum standard.'
Specifically, states are expected to treat aliens according to the traditional rule
(i.e., to pay compensation) regardless of how they treat nationals.12 t
This view is not shared by all nations, however, and has been challenged
by developing countries.' 2 2 National control over the domestic economy
is considered an element of national sovereignty; 23 requiring adherence
to a minimum standard of protection for aliens could infringe on this
sovereign function by interfering with the state's regulation of its own
economy. 2 4 States challenging the minimum standard rule take the position that "a State has discharged its international legal obligations vis-,'vis aliens if it accords them essentially the same rights-however many
or few these rights may be-that it grants its own nationals. ' "' Accordingly, they argue that disputes must be settled exclusively in the courts of
the expropriating nation.' 2 6
In drafting the Charter, the challengers' view prevailed. The Charter provides that "[i]n any case where the question of compensation gives
rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of
the nationalizing state and by its tribunals."' 27 This represents a twopronged assault on the minimum standard view embodied in the traditional rule. First, Resolution 1803 provided that disputes would be decided "in accordance with international law,"' 28 which implicitly
recognizes the minimum standard. Resolution 3171 eliminated the reference to international law and implicitly eliminated the minimum standard rule. The Charter, however, went even further and eliminated any
doubt that the minimum standard rule was being rejected: the Charter
118. Charter, supra note 106, art. 2, para. 2(c).
119. Id.
120. See generally Goldman & Paxman, supra note 79, at 163; B. WORTLIv.supra note 60.

at 140.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

B. WORTLEY, supra note 60, at 141-42. This is the "minimum standard" rule. Id.
Notes to Mexico, supra note 79, at 657.
B. WORTLEY, supra note 60, at 126-28.
See, eg., Notes to Mexico, supra note 79, at 656.
Lillich, supra note 102, at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Charter, supra note 106, art. 2, para. 2(c).
Resolution 1803, supra note 96, art. I, § 4.
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provides that any compensation disputes "shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing state."'' 29 The second prong of the assault
on the minimum standard view is in the provision that compensation
disputes are to be decided in the tribunals of the nationalizing state. This
provision presumably is intended to ensure that all compensation disputes are heard in a tribunal of the expropriating state, which is unlikely
to give aliens greater protection than it gives its own nationals.
The Charter's rejection of both the obligation to compensate and the
rules providing a minimum standard of protection for aliens is a resounding rejection of the traditional rule. There are thus two conflicting
"rules" of international law concerning a state's responsibility for injury
to aliens; the question of which rule prevails is unresolved.
3.

Legal Effect of General Assembly Resolutions and the
Charter Controversy

General Assembly Resolutions are generally considered to be recommendations only and therefore are not legally binding. 30 Since the
Charter does not create a binding rule of international law, one has to
wonder why the Charter has been so controversial.
To those states that reject the traditional rule, Charter Article 2,
paragraph 2 (c), along with Resolutions 3171, 3201, and 3202, represent
a formal statement of what they believe the international law should be.
Furthermore, inasmuch as international law is a product of the consent
of states, and a significant number of states have consented to the "rules"
enunciated in these Resolutions, the rules expressed in the Charter and in
Resolutions 3171, 3201, and 3202 arguably are rules of international
law.' 3' This interpretation is particularly attractive to states contemplating nationalization who want to avoid an international obligation to
compensate.
In a recent international arbitration proceeding Libya made the argument set forth above. The dispute arose when, in 1973 and 1974,
Libya issued several decrees purporting to nationalize oil concessions
held by two United States companies. 32 Pursuant to arbitration clauses
in the concessions, the companies commenced an international arbitral
129. Charter, supra note 106, art. 2, para. 2(c).
130. Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Releetion or
Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 301 (1975).

131. Id. at 302.
132. Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/Callfornia Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 IN'L,
LEGAL MAT'LS 1, 27 (1978).

1985l

International Law of Compensation

proceeding against Libya. Libya sent a memorandum to the President of
the International Court of Justice (whom the oil companies had petitioned for the appointment of an arbitrator), opposing arbitration on the
ground that the nationalization was a sovereign act over which an arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction.' 3 3 In stating this position, Libya relied
upon Resolutions 3171 and 3201 to establish a national right to expropriate not subject to foreign review.' 3 4 Sole Arbitrator Dupuy considered
Libya's contention in light of Resolutions 3171, 3201 and in light of the
Charter (even though Libya had not relied upon the Charter in its memorandum) and concluded that the traditional rule, and not the rule of
Charter Article 2, paragraph 2 (c), was applicable to the case.' 35 It is
worth noting that other than the preliminary memorandum sent to the
President of the International Court of Justice rejecting the jurisdiction
1 36
Ultiof the arbitral tribunal, Libya did not appear in the proceedings.
mately, a settlement predicated upon the termination of the arbitration
proceedings was reached outside of those proceedings.
The significance of this is twofold: first, Libya acted consistently
with its view of international law-the view espoused in the Charterwith impunity. Second, to the extent that "the continued validity of a
rule of customary international law requires that a clear majority of
states view. . .[the] rule as legally binding,"' 3 7 Libya's rejection of the
traditional rule in the arbitral proceeding is another crack in the already
weak foundation upon which the traditional rule rests.
Libya is not the only state that has rejected the traditional rule. At
least 104 states supported Charter Article 2, paragraph 2 (c) 3s and presumably rejected the traditional rule. The Libyan example is important
not because Libya rejected the traditional rule but because the arbitration
proceeding represented the first international legal test of the Charter
133. Id. at 27.
134. Id. at 27-28.
135. Id at 31. In concluding that the Charter itself negated the "rule' of art. 2. para. 2(c).
Sole Arbitrator Dupuy reasoned as follows: Charter art. 33, para. 2 states that the Charter
provisions are interrelated and should be construed with reference to each other. Included in
the Charter is a list of principles that govern relations between states. Principle ()i%titled
"'Fulfillmentin good faith of international obligations." Sole Arbitrator Dupuy. looking at the
legislative history, concluded that principle (j) applied to Charter art. 2, para. 2(c) and that
therefore traditional international law may operate to limit the power of tates notwithstanding the language of art. 2, para. 2(c). 17 IWT'L LEGAL MAT'iS at 31.
136. Id. at I (introductory note).
137. Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property; 75 ANI. J.
INT'L L. 553, 565 (1981).
138. Vote on Resolution 3281 (XXIX) was: 120 to 6 with 10 abstentions. A separate vote
was taken on art. 2, para. 2(c): 104 to 16 with 6 abstentions. See 14 INT'to LtiAL. MAr'tS at
264-65.
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"rule." Although the Charter did not withstand the legal challenge it
faced in the arbitration proceeding, neither was the arbitrator able effectively to impose the traditional rule upon Libya. Thus the first direct
conflict between the traditional and Charter "rules" resulted in a stalemate. With this stalemate, the arbitration became no more than an academic exercise.
Charter Article 2, paragraph 2 (c) cannot be considered an accurate
statement of the existing international law 139 due to a lack of assent by
the international community.14 0 This lack of assent, however, cuts both
ways. While on one hand the Charter fails to establish a rule of international law due to lack of assent, on the other hand assent to the Charter
is a rejection of the traditional rule. Because so many states have rejected
the traditional rule, the traditional rule arguably is no longer a recognized rule of international law. The disagreement among states may result in a situation where there "presently
is no international law
141
expropriation."'
for
compensation
regarding
E.

The Risk of Uncertainty
1. Borrower's Perspective

The conclusion that no rule of compensation for expropriation exists
is relevant to the issue of debt repudiation. If a borrowing nation, faced
142
with the internal political and economic pressures discussed above,
were to research the international law of compensation for expropriation,
it could conclude either that no law exists, 143 that the Charter states the
law, or that the traditional rule is still valid.
Either of the first two conclusions would be favorable to a nation
contemplating debt repudiation since both allow the repudiating nation
to decide how much, if any, compensation to pay. A state considering
repudiation could also look at the Libyan example and conclude that it
may act with impunity (or at least place at risk only its ability to borrow
in the future). Thus, the absence of an agreed upon international law of
139. Weston, supra note 83, at 455.
140. Although art. 2, para. 2(c) was favored by a majority of states (see 14 INT'l, LIc1CAt,
MAT'i.S 264-65), the rule expressed does not have the assent of the international community
because many of the abstentions and opposing votes were cast by the large industrialized
states. The vote thus presented a classic example of the North-South split existing in the
United Nations.
141. Note, Creating a Framework for the Re-Introduction of InternationalLaw to Contro.
versies Over Compensationfor Expropriation of Foreign Investments, 9 SYR. J.INr'L L,& COmi.
163, 174 (1982).

142. See supra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.
143. See generally Note, supra note 141.
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compensation offers incentive to a country faced with apparently insurmountable internal economic and political problems and under external
pressure to meet foreign debt payments, to repudiate its debt and test the
state of the international law.
Such a defaulting borrower could raise several arguments to support its conduct. First, the borrower could argue that one objective of
the New International Economic Order is to narrow the income gap
between the developed and developing countries. 1" Clearly in the short
term, unilateral conversion of debts into grants by repudiation would
work toward this objective. Debt repudiation would decrease the borrowing country's accounts payable, in some cases dramatically, and simultaneously reduce the lending country's accounts receivable. Thus, the
borrower's income position is strengthened while the lender's income position is weakened and the income gap between the countries narrows
commensurately.
Second, the borrower could argue that controlling one's economy is
a "rightful state function"' 4 5 with which international lenders and the
IMF were interfering. Debt repudiation could be justified as an act to
regain control of this important element of sovereignty. Finally, the borrower could turn to provisions in Resolution 3171 and the Charter which
affirm the right of states to nationalize property as a legitimate exercise of

sovereignty. 146
2.

Lender's Perspective

In the event of repudiation, the lender would first have to attempt to
recover satisfactory compensation through local tribunals. 4 7 If resorting
to local tribunals failed to satisfy the lender's demands for compensation,
the lender would then attempt to obtain satisfaction in an international
forum. If the repudiated loan had been between private parties (as opposed to governments or their agencies), the lender could institute an
international arbitral proceeding (assuming the existence of an arbitration clause in the lending agreement) or bring a court action against the
borrower where assets of the borrower could be found. If the borrower
were a government, or if the loan(s) had been internationalized, 48 the
lender would be compelled to turn to its own government to have the
144. Resolution 3201, supra note 110, preamble.
145. R. RIBEIRo, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 9
(Brazilian Embassy, Wash. D.C. 1977).

146. Resolution 3171, supra note 106; Charter, supra note 106, art. 2, para. 2(c).
147. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
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claim pursued. The lender's government could either use diplomatic
pressure or take the matter before the International Court of Justice.
Whether resort is to international arbitration or adjudication, the lender
is likely to assert the applicability of the traditional rule of state responsibility for injury to aliens.
The repudiating state, in contrast, is likely to reject the traditional
rule and use the Charter to argue that any disputes which arise out of the
repudiation are to be settled under the domestic law and by the tribunals
of the repudiating state. 149 At this point the dispute is likely to be deadlocked, particularly if the dispute is taken up by the lender's government
and brought before the International Court of Justice, where the consent
of the party states is essential.
In the absence of settlement through arbitration or adjudication, the
lender's government must exert whatever pressure it is willing and able
to exert. From an economic point of view, where there has been an expropriation without compensation, it is in the interest of the injured
party's home state to retaliate against the expropriating state by eliminating the transfer of funds.' 5 ' In the United States, there is legislation in
place which would provide for such retaliation.'' The need to resort to
retaliation, however, indicates a failure of international law to address
the problem of international debt repudiation adequately.
The lack of settled rules of international law plays into the hands of
the borrowers because the uncertainty favors the party considering testing the boundaries of the law. A bank faced with the options of either
rescheduling the debt on terms generous to the borrower or standing
firm and relying on the protection of international law, would be well
advised to accept the generous debt rescheduling. Because current international law does not require compensation payment or the imposition of
sanctions, it offers little protection to lenders and gives borrowers incentive to repudiate.
F.

Debt Moratoria and Rescheduling

The scenario more probable than actual repudiation, however, is
unilateral declaration of a payments moratorium or rescheduling of the
149. Charter, supra note 106, art. 2, para. 2(c).
150. Mintz, An Economic Analysis of Aspects of InternationalExpropriationof Property, in
2 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (R. Lillich
ed. 1973).
151. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(d) (1961) provides that the United States shall suspend assistance to
the government of any country which has nationalized or expropriated the property of any
United States citizen.
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debt on terms more favorable to the borrowers.1 52 Given the unsettled
nature of international law, borrowers may have enough bargaining
power to set repayment terms. Brazil has been able to obtain more
favorable terms than previously available' 5 3 which has caused concern
among lenders that other countries will expect the same treatment' 5
Although the borrowing nations have yet to act in concert, the prospect
of a "debtors' cartel" must be considered.' 5 5 The bargaining power of
such a cartel would be greater than the sum of the bargaining power
wielded by borrowers acting independently. 5 6 If unilateral debt repudiation by one large borrower could have serious effects on banks and the
United States economy in general, the simultaneous repudiation by many
borrowers could be devastating. Such an eventuality must be considered
and contingency plans must be developed to meet the threat.
IV.

PROPOSALS TO LENDERS

The first step in solving the problems presented by the absence of
settled international law of compensation for expropriation is for bankers
to recognize the risk this ambiguity poses for them. Several courses of
action are available. First, problems must be avoided before they occur.
This involves a genuine effort at debt renegotiation which takes into consideration the political as well as the economic/financial problems of the
borrower. For example, a country expending too much of its export earnings on debt service will be unable to rectify infrastructure problems
which contribute to its predicament. Thus, meeting external obligations
will result in perpetuating a debt crisis-a situation advantageous to no
one. It has thus been suggested that borrowers have a debt service quota
determined as a percentage of export earnings. 57 This idea merits thorough investigation, perhaps by the IMF due to its central role in international debt issues.
Because international lending is coordinated through the IMF, the
152. See, eg., Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Sept. 30, 1983, at 4, col. 2.
153. Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1983, at 2, col. 2.
154. Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 35, col. 1.
155. See e.g., The Nation, Dec. 3, 1983, at 557, col. 2.

156. This conclusion is supported by the following example: The Latin American nations
have a total foreign debt of almost $350 billion, whereas Brazil, the nation with the largest
foreign debt in the world, has foreign debts in excess of only S90 billion. Clearly, S350 billion
in debt carries more bargaining power than Brazil could ever hope to wield alone. The same is

true with respect to each of the borrowers contributing to the 5350 billion figure. The fact that
Brazil is already able to obtain concessions on its own lends support to the potential strength
of a cartel. See San Francisco Chron., Jan. 14, 1984, at 47, col. 1.

157. See supra note 66.
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unilateral actions of one lender would be insufficient to correct the
problems faced by borrowers. Thus, bankers, by expressing a willingness
to accept more generous lending terms, must convince their own governments to approve more lenient IMF lending packages. Both the lenders
and their home governments share an interest in avoiding debt repudiation. The IMF and the individual lenders must realize that they are
pushing borrowers into a corner, the only escape from which may be
debt moratorium or repudiation.
More specifically, lenders must be willing to make concessions on
two fronts: extended repayment periods and interest rate concessions.
Extended repayment periods are implicit in the quota system mentioned
above. Interest rate concessions, however, may be less acceptable to
bankers. Extended repayment periods presumably result in continued
profitability at a given rate, whereas interest rate concessions cut directly
into this profitability. Nonetheless, such concessions are not a matter of
generosity but are a rational trade-off of short term profits for long term
security. The loss of interest income would be insignificant compared to
the potential loss a repudiation would entail.
In addition to loosening the terms of repayment, lenders should
closely scrutinize their loan portfolios. The purpose of this scrutiny is to
single out and write off the worst loans. Additional reserves should be
set aside to cover or at least mitigate the effect of potential losses. " This
will serve two functions simultaneously: First, it will soften the impact
of any moratoria or repudiations on both the lender and the lender's
economy. Second, this will reduce the bargaining power which borrowers now hold over lenders. These efforts should inter alia reduce the
lenders' need to rely on the protection of international law, which, as
indicated above, is ineffectual.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Note discusses how enormous debts, in combination with economically and nationalistically motivated political instability faced by
many borrowing countries, are pushing these countries to the brink of
default. Although a defaulting country would be an international pariah,
unable to borrow in the near future, this cost may seem lower than the
price to be paid at home by honoring the debt obligations. This Note
also examined the international law which would govern an expropriation of this kind, concluding that there is no consensus on what that law
158. Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1983, at 33, col. 3.
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is. Instead of consensus, there is conflict: the traditional rule versus the
rule embodied in the Charter.
This conflict creates a dangerous uncertainty which ultimately
works to the advantage of the nation considering debt repudiation. At
best, the repudiating nation will be in a position to assert that the Charter
states the "rule"; at worst, it can assert that there is no applicable rule of
international law. In either case, the repudiating nation will be the judge
of its own conduct. With this uncertainty favoring the repudiating nation, there is a tremendous risk to lenders. It was the object of this Note
to point out this risk, as recognition is the first step toward minimizing
the risk.
Once the risk is recognized, lenders can begin to assess their own
positions and formulate appropriate responses to minimize the threat.
Two courses of action are suggested: First, lenders should be willing to
renegotiate debts, taking the borrowers' internal political and economic
situations into consideration. Renegotiation should be done directly as
well as through the IMF. This works to decrease the risk of repudiation.
The second course of action is a thorough review of existing debts with
the object of finding and beginning to write off the worst loans. This
serves to reduce the potential impact debt repudiation would have.
Finally, the governments of lending nations must resume discussing
the issue of state responsibility for injury to aliens with borrowing nations. There are no easy answers to reconciling the views of the developed countries with those of the developing countries. Nonetheless, the
effort should be made, probably through the United Nations. The developing countries' objection to international review may be reduced by a
more lenient approach to determining the amount and timing of compensation.1 59 Although the obstacles may be great, the effort of negotiating a
generally acceptable rule of compensation for injury to aliens should be
undertaken. The adoption of an acceptable rule would reduce tensions
between the developed and developing nations and encourage peaceful
settlement of any disputes which arise.

159. See generally Note, supra note 141.

